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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 18, 1990, the United Nations ("UN") General
Assembly approved the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families ("Migrant
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Convention").1 Several years later, international non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") initiated a global campaign to encourage
states to ratify the Migrant Convention. 2 Thirteen member
organizations continue this campaign today, including Human Rights
Watch, International Labour Office, and Amnesty International. 3 The
Mexican government and the UN generously funded the campaign for
many years, and campaign members worked hard to produce
campaign materials, organize awareness raising events, and release
press statements. 4 Despite these efforts, the Migrant Convention did
not enter into force until thirteen years after its adoption, 5 and to
date, only thirty-seven countries have ratified it.6 The global
ratification campaign for the Migrant Convention has failed to achieve
its goal of universal ratification.
In contrast, another human rights convention adopted by the
UN just one year before the Migrant Convention underwent rapid and
widespread ratification. On November 20, 1989, the UN General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Rights of the
Child ("CRC"). 7 Just ten months later, the CRC entered into force. 8 To
date, all 193 UN member states except Somalia and the United States
have ratified the Convention. As a tribute to the CRC's success, in
May 2000 the UN General Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to
the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict. 9 This

1.
The Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention on Rights of Migrants,
http://www.migrantsrights.org/about-campaign-engl.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). The
Migrant Convention aims to "contribute to the harmonization of the attitudes of States through
the acceptance of basic principles concerning the treatment of migrant workers and members of
their families" by requiring states to adhere to basic human rights standards in their dealings
with migrants. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, Preamble, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/158 (Dec. 18,
1990), http://www.migrantsrights.org[Int_ConvProt_ Rights_-MigWorkers Fain_1999_En.htm.
2.
December18.net, 2003 Accomplishment Report of the Steering Committee,
http://www.decemberl8.net/web/docpapers/docl214.doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
3.
Id.
Id.
4.
Decemberl8.net, UN Migrant Workers' Convention, http://www.decemberl8.net/web/
5.
general/page.php?pageID=79&menuID=36&lang=EN (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). Twenty
ratifications were required for entry into force.
6.
Id.
7.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.childrightscampaign.org/documents/
ChronologyofUniversalChildWelfare_001.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2007). The CRC promotes the
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of children.
8.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, About the CRC, http://www.childrightscampaign.
org/crcabout.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). Twenty ratifications were required for entry into
force.
9.
G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
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Optional Protocol came into force on February 12, 2002,10 with the
help of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a global
campaign that lobbies governments to agree to international laws
prohibiting the use of children in armed conflict.' Several member
organizations of the Coalition overlap with members of the Migrant
Convention campaign, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International. 12 Yet, unlike the Migrant campaign, the Coalition has
succeeded in achieving widespread ratification of the Optional
13
Protocol. As of early 2007, 110 countries had ratified the Protocol.
The Migrant Convention and CRC underwent different
ratification patterns. The Migrant Convention was slow to enter into
force, and few countries ratified it. The CRC, however, entered into
force within a year, and all but two UN member states have ratified it.
The Optional Protocol to the CRC, though implemented later, also
enjoyed quick and widespread ratification. Why did the international
community respond so differently to the two conventions? Both were
adopted by the UN within the same year, both are human rights
treaties, and both were supported by NGO-driven ratification
campaigns. What factors account for the disparity in their ratification
rates?
This Note explores this question by examining a series of
treaties that quickly entered into force and finds that certain features
of treaty ratification campaigns determine their success in achieving
broad ratification. Examining these features yields important insights
into state behavior. Studying both the shared characteristics of
successful ratification campaigns and the aspects of treaties that
make them attractive candidates for ratification reveals the reasons
that states decide to accept legally binding obligations voluntarily.
These insights expose the strengths and weaknesses of the three
generally accepted theories of state behavior:
rationalism,
constructivism, and liberalism. This Note concludes that while the
three theories of state behavior can explain the characteristics of
successful ratification campaigns alone, a complete picture of state
10. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-37 (2000), 39 I.L.M. 1285 (entered into force
Feb. 12, 2002), availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/opac.htm.
11. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, What We Do, http://www.child-soldiers.org
coalition/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
12. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, The Coalition, http://www.child-soldiers.org
/coalition/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
13. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
updated
Oct.
22,
2007),
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/
Signatories
(last
ratification/ 1l_b.htm.
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behavior emerges only when applying all three theories together.
Thus, an integrated theory is needed to best describe state behavior
within the context of treaty ratification.
Part II of this Note briefly summarizes the current
international relations theories on state behavior and discusses each
theory's explanation for ratification. Part III describes treaty
ratification campaigns generally, noting how they may vary. Part III
also describes three ratification campaigns that supported treaties
that quickly entered into force. Part IV identifies features that the
three successful ratification campaigns share: (1) a close relationship
with an international organization ("10"), (2) a clear articulation of the
normative argument, and (3) an emphasis on information
dissemination through domestic grassroots networks. It then
evaluates these shared features in light of the existing international
relations theories. Part IV also examines the rates of ratification for
the treaties and considers how international relations theory explains
the differences in ratification pace. Finally, Part V integrates the
existing theories of state behavior and suggests that states readily
ratify treaties when an NGO working in close partnership with an 10
makes normative arguments that persuade domestic actors.
II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF STATE BEHAVIOR
Few international law scholars have investigated states'
willingness to bind themselves to treaties. 14 Instead, most literature
15
focuses on state decisions to comply with treaties once committed.
Studying the initial decision to ratify a treaty, however, can yield
important insights into state behavior. Treaty law is voluntary, and
16
thus states are bound only by those treaties they decide to ratify.
This conscious decision to ratify a treaty exposes states to various

14. For examples of scholars who have investigated why states bind themselves to treaties,
see LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 51-53 (1979); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and
Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 143, 160 (2001).
15. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938-39 (2002) (examining nations' compliance with human rights treaties);
Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599-603 (1997)
(reviewing two books on the subject and proposing a "more complete approach toward
understanding why nations obey" international law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (discussing norms and
the legal regulation of norms).
16. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An Integrated Theory of International
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 487 (2005).
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pressures. Examining how states react to these pressures gives a
valuable opportunity to evaluate the theories of state behavior.
There are three generally accepted international relations
theories of state behavior: rationalism, constructivism, and
liberalism."i Variations of each theory exist, but each carries a distinct
set of assumptions and rationales about state behavior. Not
surprisingly, the theories differ in their predictions of when a state
will ratify a treaty. This Part briefly describes the theories of
international law and their predictions for ratification, laying the
foundation for the following Parts that will test these theories of state
behavior by examining the shared factors underlying widespread
treaty ratification.
A. Rationalism
Rationalism posits that states seek power and behave in ways
that are comprehensible to rational outsiders.' 8 The state is the key
unit of analysis in rationalist theories. Rationalists assume that states
have consistent, ordered preferences that they use to calculate the
costs and benefits of their actions. States act in ways that maximize
their utility in light of their preferences and perceptions of reality. 19
States are always "strategically competent," or capable of identifying
self-interests and pursuing them rationally. 20 Under rationalism, any
change in international law and politics reflects changes in the
17. International relations theory has become an important legal tool over the past twentyfive years and therefore has found its way into mainstream international legal scholarship. See
Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State
Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1909 (1992) (drawing a distinction between "liberal" and
"nonliberal" states, and using that distinction to analyze transnational legal relations); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749,
1750 (2003) (analyzing how states are empowered by international constraints and constrained
by the rules and identities associated with state sovereignty); Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise
of InternationalLaw, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 533-35 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)); Laurence R. Helfer, UnderstandingChange
in InternationalOrganizations: Globalizationand Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649,
665-66 (2006) (analyzing international organizations' role in promoting interstate cooperation);
John 0. McGinnis & Mark K. Movesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511,
513-14 (2000) (arguing that the World Trade Organization does not threaten members'
sovereignty, and that its regulatory authority should not be expanded); Eric A. Posner,
International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2006) (applying a
"welfarist perspective" to international law).
18. Robert 0. Keohane, Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics, in
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 7 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986).
19. Id. at 11.
20. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, InternationalLaw and Constructivism:Elements of
an InteractionalTheory or InternationalLaw, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 27 (2000) (citation
omitted).
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distribution of power among states. 21 Indeed, power is the "currency of
the international system" and relative power determines state
interactions.22
According to rationalist theory, economic interests and
objective
conditions produce
state interests. 23 States view
international norms as an instrument for increasing state power, and
these norms are enforceable only by controlling states. 24 Norms matter
to the degree that they affect state actors' strategies by "reducing
transaction costs, identifying focal points of coordinated behavior, and
by providing frameworks for productive issue-linkage." 25 Power and
self-interest motivate states; however, a state will not admit publicly
that its foreign policy is driven solely by these factors. 26 Instead,
rationalists explain that states use moral rhetoric in international
politics to signal cooperation to other nations without actually losing
27
power.
Rationalism is often associated with coercion as a social
mechanism of state behavior. 28 Coercion occurs when a state
influences the behavior of other states by "escalating the benefits of
conformity or the costs of nonconformity through material rewards
and punishments. '29 States may be coerced to change their behavior
when they believe that it is in their material interest to do so. For
example, a state may coerce another state through economic sanctions
such as travel bans and embargos. 30 Or, a state may use its military
force to coerce another. 3 1
Rationalism provides several mechanisms for predicting how
states will behave. It predicts that a state will bind itself to a treaty
only under certain conditions. A state will ratify a treaty when a more
21. Keohane, supra note 18, at 15.
22. Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 507 (1995).
23. Hathaway, supra note 16, at 478-79.
24. Slaughter, supranote 22.
25. Andrew Hurrell, Norms and Ethics in International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
26. Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in InternationalRelations:
A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115, S124 (2002).
27. Id. at S125.
28. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 634 (2004).
29. Id. at 633.
30. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & W. Michael Reisman, The Costs and Benefits of
Economic Sanctions: The Bottom Line, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 337, 339-40, 351, 359 (1995).
31. G. John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, 44 INT'L
ORG. 283, 285 (1990) (finding that hegemons use material incentives and physical power to alter
the political and economic incentives of other states).
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powerful nation coerces it to ratify or when ratification yields
beneficial results. In either case, states commit only when presented
with a clear, objective reward. 32 Indeed, rationalist scholars argue that
every treaty challenges lawmakers with the problem of power
differentiation among states; more powerful states require
accommodation, and less powerful states desire to participate as
"sovereign equals."33 Ultimately, rationalism predicts that a powerful
state will ratify a treaty that promotes its interests, and a weaker
state will ratify if pressured by a greater power.
Recently, Professor Oona Hathaway presented an integrated
theory of international law combining several theories of state
behavior that included a rationalist explanation for ratification. 34 Her
theory suggests that treaty enforcement and the "collateral
consequences" of ratification influence a state's decision to ratify. She
argues that when legal enforcement of a treaty is more likely, fewer
states will commit.35 Professor Hathaway also contends that states are
influenced by the "collateral consequences" that arise from the
anticipated reactions of individuals, states, and organizations to the
state's decision to commit to the treaty. Collateral consequences
include the implicit or explicit linking of foreign aid or trade to
36
ratification and the influence of ratification on state reputation.
These combined effects influence a state's decision to commit to a
treaty.
A common critique of rationalism is that it fails to account for
the ratification of human rights treaties. Members of human rights
treaties do not receive economic benefits, such as trade privileges, and
they incur the cost of diminished sovereignty. 37 Professors Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner responded to this critique by examining
the ratification pattern of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 38 which contains first-generation civil and

32. See Chinen, supra note 14, at 161 (arguing that either the conditions that make
cooperation possible under repeated prisoner's dilemmas must be present to explain treaties, or
treaties result from communication or other factors that do not fit appropriately in a standard
prisoner's dilemma or coordination game).
33.

OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 80 (1991).

34. Hathaway, supra note 16, at 498.
35. Id. at 514. Actors in both the domestic and transnational realms may push states away
from committing to a treaty if those actors increase the costs of treaty membership by increasing
the likelihood of compliance.
36. Id. at 508-09.
37. Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1827 (2003)
("[H]uman rights treaties impose a cost.., because they require ratifying nations to surrender
power to inspect the relationship between the state and its citizens.").
38. Chinen, supra note 14, at 157.
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political rights and is one of the first binding international human
rights treaties. 39 They found that while the costs of ratifying the
ICCPR are low because there is little enforcement, 40 the benefits may
be significant. States that ratify treaties have the benefit of "cheap
talk."4 1 In other words, the processes and conventions associated with
treaties provide information that enhances cooperation or provides
assurance. 42 A treaty, therefore, identifies "focal points that align
expectations about which behaviors count as cooperation" 43 and lowers
44
the communication and transaction costs of cooperation.
Ultimately, Goldsmith and Posner concluded that widespread
ratification of human rights treaties occurs when the costs of
ratification are very small.45 All ratifying states receive the benefit of
immunity from international criticism, and smaller states may be
more likely to receive aid if they ratify. 46 Treaties offer different
advantages to more powerful states because they represent clear and
well-defined obligations and provide for explicit dispute resolution. 47
Rationalism, therefore, explains the ratification of human rights
treaties in terms of material costs and benefits to the ratifying state.
In sum, rationalism assumes that states calculate the costs and
benefits of their behavior before acting. These costs and benefits are
determined by the state's self-interest and relative power. Therefore,
rationalism predicts that states will ratify treaties when it is in their
self-interest to do so, and weaker states may be coerced to ratify
treaties when powerful states offer material rewards and
punishments. A state will ratify when a treaty offers material benefits
or when a more powerful state coerces ratification.

39. First generation rights are fundamentally civil and political. They include, for example,
freedom of religion, right to a fair trial, and right to vote.
40. Chinen, supra note 14, at 154-55.
41.

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 17, at 89.

42. Id. (observing that the final version of treaties "often requires many of the parties to do
nothing different from what they have done in the past"). Goldsmith and Posner present a theory
of state rationalism that is grounded in game theory and emphasizes the states' strategies
through interactions.
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 128.
47. Andrew T. Gutzman, A Compliance-BasedTheory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1873 (2002).
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B. Constructivism
Despite the strong rationalist history of political science
scholarship, international legal scholarship generally has remained
rooted in constructivist, "normative" models. 48 Constructivism seeks to
understand the normative influence on state behavior, asking how
norms evolve and what constitutes a state's identity. 49 In general,
constructivist models have four primary characteristics. 5 0 First, the
theories emphasize the role of ideas in constructing social change and
state behavior.5 1 Ideas are individual beliefs about right and wrong
that may develop into norms, 52 whereas norms "prescribe patterns of
behavior which give[ ] rise to normative expectations as to what ought
to be done." 53 Therefore, once ideas have become norms, they may
influence the behavior of states. Scholars have devoted a great deal of
54
study to the process of "socialization" by which ideas become norms.
Second, constructivist theories posit that agents may be
subjective decisionmakers.5 5 Actors, therefore, are capable of being
persuaded by normative arguments. 56 Contrary to a rationalist costbenefit analysis, persuasion is the active inculcation of norms;
persuaded actors "internalize" new norms and redefine their interests
and identities accordingly. 57 States only internalize a norm when
"consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of a
norm."5 8 Under constructivism state actors may be persuaded to
change their interests and behavior.
Third, constructivism focuses on the holistic nature of the
social environment. 59 Social structures give meaning to the interests of

48. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (2006).
49. Id. at 1411.
50. James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism:A Skeptical View, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 52, 57.
51. Id.
52. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 (Thomas
Risse et al. eds., 1999).
53. Andrew Hurrell, supranote 25, at 143 (emphasis added).
54. See generally Harold H. Koh, InternalizationThrough Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975,
975-82 (2005) (discussing Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks' work in the area of
socialization and international law).
55. Fearon & Wendt, supra note 50.
56. Brunnee & Toope, supra note 20.
57. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 28, at 635.
58. Id. Persuasion occurs when states actively "change their minds." Id.
59. Fearon & Wendt, supranote 50, at 57-58.
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states through norms, identity, knowledge, and culture. 60 State
interests are formed through interactions with other states because
social structures both constrain actors and enable them to develop
their interests. 61 Importantly, these "shared understandings" shape
the social environment itself.62 Transnational networks, therefore, are
important influences on state behavior because a state's interest
changes as the interests of its neighboring states change. 63 In this
vein, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue that a "norm
cascade" results when a critical mass of states' behavior reaches a
tipping point. 64 Once enough states have adopted a norm, other states
will be motivated by a desire to enhance their legitimacy, reputation,
and esteem to also adopt the norm. 65 External normative pressures
become more powerful once a critical mass of states behaves in a
certain way. 66 State interactions, therefore, inform and change state
interests.
Fourth, constructivism adopts a constitutive rather than causal
approach to understanding state behavior. Simply stated, what a state
wants depends on who the state is.67 For example, a constitutive
theory of statehood argues that a state's identity depends on its
68
network of social relations rather than its de facto characteristics.
Therefore, a constructivist perception of social structure focuses on the
identity of an actor itself as generating state interests, rather than
state identity as an exogenous variable. 69 States are influenced by
their neighbors and by how their neighbors are behaving.
Critics of constructivism claim that it permits too much
variation on substantive issues. 70 For example, constructivism does
not explain why some norms are persuasive and others are not. In
addition, constructivist theories rarely predict state behavior, tending

60. Brunnee & Toope, supranote 20, at 29.
61. Id. at 31.
62. Id.
63.

MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 211-17 (1998).

64. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Risse & Sikkink, supra note 52, at 9.
68.

JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-19 (2005)

(presenting a constitutive theory of statehood that defines a state as a state when it is recognized
as a sovereign by other states).
69. See Brunnee & Toope, supra note 20, at 30 (explaining that the idea that identity
formation is relational is a central constructivist concept).
70. See Fearon & Wendt, supra note 50, at 56 (arguing that constructivism is not a theory of
international law because of substantive variations in models).
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to be more descriptive.7 1 Constructivism, nevertheless, adds an
important idea to the behavioral theories of international law: state
power is not the only, nor even the central, influence on states; rather,
normative arguments can persuade states to act. Thus, changes in
72
international norms can lead to changes in state behavior.
Norms also may be diffused through transnational networks
that socialize states using normative arguments. NGO transnational
issue networks are essential to this diffusion process because NGOs
use communicative structures to pressure target actors to ratify
73
treaties in both the domestic and international political spheres.
These networks depend on the power of information, ideas, and
strategies to persuade states to ratify. 74 Risse and Sikkink argue that
the issues best suited for these networks embody powerful norms,
such as preventing bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and securing
legal equality of opportunity. 75 Once a state has internalized these
diffused norms, it is more likely to ratify a treaty that promotes them.
Additionally, state behavior can be transformed through
"linkage," which occurs when an advocacy network links a principled
idea to material goals, such as military aid, economic aid, or trade
benefits.7 6 International organizations are often effective linkage
vehicles because they can promote cooperation through ongoing
contact among members.7 7 For example, the World Trade
Organization has connected trade benefits with a variety of treaties,
such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"). 78 Linkage goes beyond rationalism to explain state
behavior because it provides a mechanism for exposing states to
norms and encouraging their acceptance.
In summary, constructivism offers several important insights
into the process of ratification. A state ratifies a treaty in part because
of its commitment to the norms or ideas that it embodies, 79 so states
must first be persuaded by these norms. Therefore, actors desiring
ratification, both on the state and transnational level, may appeal to a

71. Hathaway, supranote 16, at 485.
72. Risse & Sikkink, supra note 52, at 2.
73. Id. (arguing that members of transnational advocacy networks are bound by common
principles and a normative agenda for enacting transnational social change).
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin
America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411, 437 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Jos6 E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 147 (2002).
79. Hathaway, supranote 16, at 477.
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state's normative ideals by strategically using information, symbols,
and stories.80 Once a treaty's values are engaged or developed within a
state, the state will be motivated to ratify. International organization
efforts to link normative ideas to material goals also may encourage
states to ratify.
C. Liberalism
Liberalism focuses on the impact that domestic politics has on
state behavior. Liberal theories assume that individuals and private
groups are the key actors in state behavior. States themselves are not
insignificant, but state preferences are determined by domestic
politics rather than material factors like relative state power.8 1 Unlike
rationalism and constructivism, therefore, liberalism asserts that the
relevant actors are "individuals and groups acting in domestic and
transnational" society.8 2 Liberalism focuses on the domestic realm,
state-society relations, and the interest-group dynamics within each
state.8 3 Consequently, under liberalism, state behavior results from
political, legal, economic, social, and cultural domestic factors rather
than the relative distribution of international power.8 4 Therefore, to
understand the behavior of states, researchers must examine domestic
politics and structures because the state interacts with political
players at the domestic level, and this interaction determines state
preferences.8 5 Ultimately, the aggregation of domestic and
transnational individual interests becomes the interests of the state.8 6
Structural links between international institutions and
domestic actors are also important to liberal theory.8 7 Dean AnneMarie Slaughter argues that "government networks" are "key
feature[s] of world order in the twenty-first century."8 8 Slaughter uses
the term "government network" to describe how individual state

80.

KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 63, at 16.

81.

David Schleicher, Liberal InternationalLaw Theory and the United Nations Mission in

Kosovo: Ideas and Practice, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 179, 194 (2005) ("[I]ndividual policy

actors-and not rational, unitary states-are given the lead position in negotiating norms in
transnational space.").
82. Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 508 (1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 510-11.
86. Id.
87. Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, InternationalRelations and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 538, 547.
88.

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 1 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004).
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domestic institutions interact with their international counterparts.8 9
These networks create patterns of relations among government
units-in both the domestic and international spheres-that influence
state behavior. 90
In addition, liberal theory contends that states behave
according to their internal constitutions. 9 1 Distinguishing between
"liberal" and "non-liberal" regimes, the theory defines liberal regimes
as those with democratically elected government and market
economies. 92 This distinction aids empirical evaluation of state
behavior because scholars classify states as liberal or non-liberal and
compare their conduct. But, liberal theory applies to all states,
including totalitarian, authoritarian, and theocratic regimes, because
it emphasizes the importance of domestic politics in all types of
governments. 93 The emphasis on domestic politics is liberalism's
important contribution to state behavior theories.
A common critique of liberal theory is that the complexity of
interest-group politics precludes liberalism from predicting how
nations will behave. 94 Liberal theory is useful, however, because it
opens the "black box" of domestic politics that otherwise might not be
considered as influencing state behavior. 95 Liberalism considers how
domestic groups influence and shape state behavior.
Although liberalism offers important insights into state
behavior, little scholarship on treaty ratification has been written
from a liberal perspective. Because liberal theory argues that domestic
interests shape states' actions internationally, 96 a liberal theory of
ratification would predict that states ratify treaties when powerful
domestic actors lobby for ratification. It follows that ratification is
achieved more quickly in states where domestic actors can express
preferences to their governments. 97 Ratification occurs more readily in
democratic states because such states are more responsive to the
preferences of domestic interest groups. 98 Indeed, Risse and Sikkink
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Josb E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal

Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183, 184 (2001).

92. Id.
93. Slaughter, supra note 22, at 509.
94. Gutzman, supranote 47, at 1839.
95. Hathaway, supranote 16, at 484.
96. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513-14 (1997).
97. Id. at 514.
98. See Slaughter, supra note 22, at 510 (discussing significant characteristics of relations
between states, domestic actors, and transnational society).
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observe that ratification campaigns are most successful in countries
"that have internalized the discourse of liberalism to a greater
degree." 99 Therefore, ratification is achieved more quickly in states
where domestic actors are able to express their preferences to their
governments.
Liberalism differs from rationalism and constructivism because
it argues that domestic politics-and not international factors like
state power or transnational networks-determine state preferences.
Interest groups within a state are powerful actors and advocates that
should target these groups if they seek to encourage certain state
behavior, such as ratification. A liberal approach is useful, therefore,
because it considers the influence of domestic activities on state
behavior.
Rationalism, constructivism, and liberalism suggest different
causes for state behavior and offer different predictions as to when
states will ratify a treaty. Rationalism predicts that states ratify
treaties when ratification offers material benefits or when coerced by a
more powerful state. Constructivism posits that states ratify treaties
when they share the values embodied in the treaty. If a state does not
share these values initially, it may be persuaded by normative
arguments. Liberal theories expect that states ratify treaties when
domestic actors support and lobby for ratification and predict that if
powerful domestic actors oppose ratification, then ratification is
unlikely. The next Part of this Note assesses the comparative
predictive power of these theories of state behavior by examining the
common factors underlying ratification of treaties supported by NGO
ratification campaigns.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL TREATY RATIFICATION
CAMPAIGNS
The last Part discussed three general theories of state behavior
and their respective explanations for why states choose to ratify
treaties. This Part examines the shared characteristics of three
successful ratification campaigns. Scrutinizing these characteristics
will shed light on the accuracy of the three theories described above.
This Part begins by discussing treaty ratification campaigns generally
and how they may vary. It then focuses on three treaty ratification
campaigns: the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the
Global Ban on Landmines campaign, and the campaign to ratify the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
99.

Risse & Sikkink, supra note 52, at 38.
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A. Variation in Function, Leadership, and Goal
A treaty ratification campaign coordinates global efforts to
achieve widespread ratification of a particular treaty. Diverse sources
fund these campaigns, which typically involve several types of
international and domestic actors. 10 0 As of December 2006, almost
twenty global treaty ratification campaigns existed.10 1 These treaty
campaigns vary substantively and include human rights, trade,
health, labor, military, and environmental law treaties. All treaty
ratification campaigns, however, rally around a particular treaty and
prioritize ratification as the main goal.
Both IOs, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO)
and non-state actors, such as NGOs, have spearheaded campaigns.
For example, in 1980 the UN created a Working Group on the
Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of Human Rights
Instruments to advance ratification of the major human rights
treaties.'0 2 The UN directed the Working Group to ask non-ratifying
states why they opposed ratification. The Group used the answers it
received to facilitate expedited ratification based on mutually
agreeable solutions.'0 3 NGO ratification networks, which emerged in
the 1960s in response to the UN's failure to respond to systematic,
global human rights violations, function similarly and have taken the
104
forefront in global ratification efforts.
The goals of ratification campaigns also differ because a
campaign may devote resources either to convincing the most powerful
nations to ratify or to achieving the greatest number of ratifications
possible. The aim of a ratification campaign often shifts as more states
become members. For example, at an early stage of ratification, the
goal may be for the treaty to enter into force; 10 5 later in the process,
the goal may be universal ratification.10 6 Campaigns also may push to

100. For example, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court is funded by the UN
and also solicits private donations. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Make a
Donation, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=donate (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
101. See Table 1, infra p. 117 (listing global ratification campaigns).
102. David Weissbrodt, A New United Nations Mechanism for Encouragingthe Ratification
of Treaties, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 333, 333 (1982).
103. Id. at 336.
104. Hans P. Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalHuman Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 25, at 517, 531.
105. International Food Security Treaty Campaign, End Hunger by Law, http://www.
treaty.orglMainFrame.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
106. See International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, Convention Against
Torture, http://www.irct.org/Default.aspx?ID=27 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) (stating that
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reduce the number of states making reservations, declarations, or
understandings, which can effectively "gut" a treaty. 10 7 Although
ratification campaigns differ in many respects, most seek widespread
ratification of a particular treaty and develop a strategy to do so.
Table 1: GLOBAL RATIFICATION CAMPAIGNS
Treaty

Ratification campaign

Arms Trade Treaty

Control Arms Campaign

Convention on the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families

The Global Campaign for Ratification of the
Convention on Rights of Migrants

Convention on the Rights of the
Child

Campaign for the Convention on the Rights of
the Child; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers

Convention to Ban Landmines

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Cybercrime Treaty

Coalition of the Cybercrime Treaty

Framework Convention for
Tobacco Control

Network for Accountability of Tobacco;
Transnationals, Framework Convention
Alliance

Global Wellness Fund Treaty

Alliance for the Global Wellness Fund Treaty

International Food Security
Treaty

The International Food Security Treaty
Campaign
Campaign against Climate Change

Kyoto Protocol
Protocol to the African Charter
and the Rights of Women in
Africa

Human Rights Watch: Take Action

Rome Statute

Coalition for the International Criminal Court

Stockholm Convention,
Rotterdam Convention and the
Montreal Protocol (Persistent
organic pollutants effort)

Pesticide Action Network North America

The Agreement on the
Conservation of Albatrosses and
Petrels

Save the Albatross

UN Convention Against Torture

Campaign for the Ratification of the UN
Convention Against Torture

universal ratification is the goal of the Campaign for the Ratification of the UN Convention
against Torture).
107. Jeffery Huffines, The Role Of N.G.O.s in U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 3
ILSA J. IN'L & COMP. L. 641, 644 (1997).
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UN Terrorism Conventions

UN Terrorism Working Group

Water Treaty

Right to Water Campaign

Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention

Red Card to Child Labor Campaign
(International Labor Organization)

B. Treaties with Ratification Campaigns
The campaigns analyzed in this Part were selected because
each is NGO-driven, began in the 1990s, seeks universal ratification of
a multilateral treaty, and supports a treaty that rapidly entered into
force. Importantly, the treaties these campaigns supported vary
substantively so that the subsequent analysis is not limited to one
type of treaty (i.e., human rights). One campaign establishes an
international criminal court, the second bans the use of a military
weapon, and the third promotes global health. The campaigns arose in
different political contexts and in response to different global
problems. Therefore, the features they share are not a function of
similar subject matter or an overlap in ratification efforts.
1. Coalition for the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") to hold individuals criminally responsible for "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole."' 08 These crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.10 9 The Rome Statute obligates state parties to
cooperate fully in the investigation and prosecution of crimes before
the court. In addition, the ICC may exercise personal jurisdiction over
state parties' citizens, a feature that distinguishes the ICC from other
permanent international tribunals, such as the International Court of
Justice. The ICC contains a principle of "complementarity," which
vests primary jurisdiction in state parties unless the ICC determines
that the state is "genuinely unwilling or unable" to prosecute. 10 The
principle of complementarity is controversial, however, because it
empowers the ICC to seize jurisdiction over a case according to its
own, unreviewable determination of state unwillingness or inability to
prosecute. Therefore, a state desiring jurisdiction over a case may be
forced to transfer it to the ICC.
108. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9
[hereinafter Rome
(1998), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm
Statute].
109. Id. arts. 5-8.

110. Id. art. 17.
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The ICC and the UN share a complex partnership. Although
the ICC is not a UN court, it shares a very close philosophical, legal,
and political relationship with the UN. The Rome Statute was
negotiated under the UN's auspices; indeed, the conferences to draft
the ICC were held in the offices of the UN. 111 Article 2 of the Rome
Statute states that the "United Nations and the Court agree that...
they shall cooperate closely." 112 Importantly, the ICC may exercise3
jurisdiction over a case referred to it by the UN Security Council."
The UN also holds an important check on the Court: the UN Security
Council has the authority to delay a prosecution for a year. 114 As such,
the UN can postpone controversial trials. Thus, UN officials had a
significant role in shaping the ICC and continue to play a role in its
function.
Entry into force. The Rome Statute opened for signature in July
1999 and entered into force on July 1, 2002. Ratification occurred
quickly in the first years that the treaty was open for signature. By
the end of 2002, eighty-seven states had ratified. In the next three
years, however, the rate of ratification declined substantially. 1 5 In
2003 and again in 2004, only five states became parties to the statute,
and just three additional states ratified in 2005.116 To date, 104 states
have ratified the Rome Statute," 7 with the notable exceptions of the
United States and China. Further, the U.S. has consistently shown an
"attitude of active opposition" to the ICC."18 On May 6, 2002, the Bush
Administration announced that the United States did not intend to
become a party to the Rome Statute, 1 9 and Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld explained in a press statement that the Administration had
"a number of serious objections" to the ICC and would not become a

111. Interview with Brigitte Suhr, Reg'l Coordinator, Coal. for the Int'l Criminal Court, in
Nashville, Tenn. (Jan. 18, 2007).
112. Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the
United Nations, art. 3, http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/aspICC-ASP-3-ReslEnglish.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008).
113. Rome Statute, supra note 108, art. 13.
114. Id. art. 16.
115. Int'l Criminal Court, Report of the Bureau on ratification and implementation of the
Rome Statute and on participationin the Assembly of State Parties,ICC-ASP/5/26 (Nov. 17, 2006)
http:/lwww.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-26-English.pdf.
116. COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE

ICC 1-2 (2006), http:/liccnow.org/documents/RATIFICATIONSbyUNGroups.pdf.
117. Id.

118. Gerhard Hafner, An Attempt to Explain the Position of the USA Towards the ICC, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 323, 324 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court
Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
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party. 120 Although ratification of the Rome Statute has slowed, its
rapid ratification signaled the campaign's success.
Campaign characteristics. A group of NGOs created the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court ("CICC")in 1995, even
before the language of the Rome Statute was finalized. 121 The CICC
initially sought to "support the establishment of a fair, effective and
independent International Criminal Court" and help the Rome Statute
enter into force. 122 Once the Rome Statute was open for ratification,
the CICC shifted its focus to achieving universal ratification. 123 Today,
it states its purpose as "support[ing] the universal establishment of a
fair, effective and independent International Criminal Court"
(emphasis added). 124 This statement appeals to norms of autonomy,
fair process, and justice. An independent international court that sits
to fairly try individuals accused of heinous crimes is also an attractive
cause.
The CICC recognizes the importance of information
dissemination in persuading states to ratify the Rome Statute. It
publishes various reports that inform and educate states about the
ICC. 125 One of these publications is a Manual on the Ratification and
Implementation of the Rome Statute, 126 which describes the ICC's
purpose, legal provisions, and ratification procedures for any
interested state government. When targeting a specific country, the
CICC writes papers specifically targeted to that country.
Disseminating this information "energizes" national groups and
facilitates ratification. 12 7 The CICC developed dozens of fact sheets,
core documents, and books with titles such as "The Case for
Ratification," "Ensuring Justice for Children," and "Ensuring Justice

120. News Release, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3337.
121. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Welcome, http://iccnow.org/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
122. Message from the Coalition of the International Criminal Court, William R. Pace,
Convener of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Feb. 10, 2005)
http://www.iccnow.org/index.php?mod=browserdoc&type=5&b=2.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. at 1.
125. These include ICC Monitor, Insight on the ICC, ICC Update, Agenda CPI, European
Newsletter, Al Mahkamah, and ICC-Africa.
126. RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY & INT'L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE POLICY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MANUAL FOR THE RATIFICATION AND
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
(2000),
STATUTE
ROME
OF
THE
IMPLEMENTATION

RightsDem&ICCLR ManualEng.pdf.
127. Interview, supra note 111.
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for Victims." 128 As the titles suggest, these documents present
normative arguments for ratification. The CICC, therefore, targets
domestic groups and persuades them to act by appealing to strong
norms.
The CICC also relies on the efforts of its member organizations.
Over 2,000 organizations in more than fifty nations participate in the
CICC. These organizations aid the campaign as central players in the
CICC's advocacy missions. 129 Advocacy missions focus campaign
efforts for a period in a particular state to motivate ratification.
During these missions, the CICC regional coordinator depends on four
or five national NGOs to work with the press and influence civil
society through political momentum and public support. If the
missions make ratification a national priority, then ratification is

likely. 130
2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The Convention to Ban Landmines ("Ottawa Convention") is an
international agreement that bans antipersonnel landmines. Several
actors advocated for the ban including NGOs, the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), and the UN. The ICRC helped
steer the Ottawa Process during treaty negotiations by initiating
expert conferences and publishing reports on the tragic effects of
landmines.' 31 The ICRC announced that only a complete ban could
solve the humanitarian disaster caused by landmines.' 32 Similarly,
interested UN agencies, such as the Department of Humanitarian
Affairs ("UNDHA") and the Children's Fund ("UNICEF'), called for a
complete ban in 1994,133 and the High Commission for Refugees
("UNHCR") joined the two UN agencies several months later in
publicly supporting a ban.' 34 The broad coalition to abolish the use of
landmines thus carried the official support of the UN humanitarian
agencies.
Entry into force. The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines ("ICBL") launched an extremely successful campaign,

128. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Fact Sheets and Core Texts,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=fsdoc (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
129. Interview, supra note 111.
130. Id.
131. Don Hubert, The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in HumanitarianAdvocacy, WATSON
INST. FOR INT'L STUD., 2000, at 9-10, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/op42.pdf.

132. Id.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id.
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directing the Ottawa Convention from its opening for signature on

December 3, 1997, to its entry into force on March 1,

1999.135

The

Ottawa Convention entered into force more quickly than any other
human rights treaty in history. 136 Fifty-seven countries ratified the
Ottawa Convention within one year, and as of November 2007, 155
countries had ratified. 137 Notably, eleven countries have failed to
ratify the Ottawa Convention, 138 including several powerful nations
such as the United States, China, and Russia. While the United States
has not ratified the Ottawa Convention, it has publicly supported the
"spirit" of the treaty. 139 In a report entitled "To Walk the Earth in
Safety" released by the State Department in 2004, the United States
publicized its "commitment to help rid the world of landmines that
140
threaten civilians around the world."'
Campaign characteristics.The ICBL was founded in 1991 with
the goal of eradicating antipersonnel landmines globally.' 4 ' Professor
Richard Price noted that the campaign's key strategy focused on
creating
an
international
norm
prohibiting
antipersonnel
landmines. 142 The ICBL framed the landmine issue as a humanitarian
disaster and educated both policymakers and the public through
politicized debates. 43 Once several states had ratified the treaty,
reaching a "critical mass," then global social pressures fostered more
135. Id. at 14. The official title of the Convention is the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
136. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, What is the Mine Ban Treaty?,
http://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/treaty/what (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
137. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, State Parties, http://www.icbl.org/
treaty/members (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
138. Id. These countries are Burma, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Nepal, North Korea, Russia,
South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam.
139. Sarah Elizabeth Kreps & Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a
Positional Theory of Adherence to InternationalLegal Regimes, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 331,
374 (2006).
140. Id. (citing OFFICE OF WEAPONS REMOVAL & ABATEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE
UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION: TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY

10 (5th ed. Aug. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2004/.
The
report noted:
This effort supports the U.S. Strategic Objectives to advance sustainable development
and global interests by providing a humanitarian response to the harmful social and
economic effects generated by landmines and unexploded ordinance and to advance
peace and security by promoting regional stability through the use of mine action as a
confidence-building measure.
Id.
141. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Campaign History, http://www.icbl.org
campaign/history (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
142. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land
Mines, 32 INT'L ORG. 613 (1998).
143. Id. at 640.
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state support. 144 Professor Price emphasized that the relative
simplicity of the norm contributed to its rapid acceptance; 145 would-be
violators had "little room to finesse questions of violation and
compliance through interpretive ambiguities of the norm."146 Visual
media, including traveling photography exhibits, videos highlighting
the impact of landmines, and televised documentaries, effectively
appealed to the norm of protecting human health. 147
The ICBL identifies itself as a flexible network of national
groups that works "from the bottom up" and engages domestic
organizations. 148 Indeed, the "strength and cohesiveness of a diverse
set of NGOs was a crucial factor in the success of the campaign."'149
Close links between domestic campaigns and the ICBL were the
campaign's greatest strength and ensured consistent and coordinated
1 50
lobbying.
3. Campaign to Ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC") is a
global public health treaty created and negotiated by the World
Health Organization ("WHO"). 151 The FCTC aims to reduce tobacco-

related deaths and diseases around the world. 152 The treaty requires
state parties to impose restrictions on tobacco advertising, sponsorship
and promotion, and to establish new packaging and labeling for
tobacco products. 153 In 1996, the World Health Assembly ("WHA")
requested that the WHO Director-General develop a treaty to control
the spread of tobacco addiction. 154 Director-General Gro Harlem
144. Id. ("Once states perceive that an incipient norm has reached a certain level of support
among states, a second social systemic process-emulation-is likely to play a stronger role as
key decision makers embrace the new norm in order to avoid outlier status.").

145. Id. at 641.
146. Id.
147. See Hubert, supra note 131, at 31-32 ("Effective use was also made of the visual media
including traveling photograph exhibits, videos highlighting the impact of landmines, and
televised documentaries.").
148. Price, supra note 142, at 641.
149. Hubert, supra note 131, at 32.
150. Id. at 33.
151. The World Health Organization, The WHO FCTC: A Global Health Treaty,
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/background/en (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). A framework
treaty includes provisions for negotiating separate subsidiary agreements periodically.
SCHACTER, supranote 33, at 77.
152. An International Treaty for Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG., Aug. 12, 2003,
http://www.who.int/features/2003/08/en/.
153. Id.
154. Sean D. Murphy, Adoption of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 689, 689 (2003) ("On May 25, 1996, the World Health Assembly (WHA) of the World
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Brundtland put the global tobacco treaty on a "fast track." In October
1999 and March 2000, the WHO and its member states convened
working groups to draft elements of the global tobacco treaty. 15 5 In
May 2003, the WHA adopted the text of the FCTC proposed by the
WHO, and the treaty opened for signature on June 16, 2003.
Entry into force. The FCTC opened for signature on June 16,
2003.156 On February 27, 2005, less than two years later, the fortieth
required state ratified the treaty, bringing it into force. 157 Unlike other
treaties, it has maintained its momentum and achieved impressive
ratification numbers every year since it opened for signature. 158 As of
November 2007, 151 states were party to the FCTC. 159 Although the
United States has not yet ratified the treaty, it was among the first
wave of nations to sign in May 2004.160
Campaign characteristics.Over 200 NGOs have promoted the
FCTC, but two have official relations with the WHO: 161 the
Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) and the Network for
These
("NATT").
Transnationals
Accountability
of Tobacco
The
promoting
the
FCTC.
purposes
in
organizations serve different
FCA serves a "watchdog function," whereas NATT's mission is to
1 62
NATT was formed in 1999 with a
encourage ratification.
"grassroots" focus;163 significantly, it produces and distributes a
handbook on FCTC ratification campaigns that illustrates how an
individual citizen may launch a campaign, mobilize popular support,
164
and implement strategies.

Health Organization (WHO) requested the WHO director-general to initiate the development of a
framework convention on tobacco control.").
International, Global Tobacco Treaty, http:/fwww.
155. Corporate Accountability
stopcorporateabuse.org/cms/pagel 143.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
156. The World Health Organization, supra note 151.
157. World Health Organization, Updated status of the WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/countrylist/eiindex.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
158. In 2004, forty-four states ratified. In 2005, sixty-six states ratified. In 2006, twenty-six
states ratified.
159. An InternationalTreaty for Tobacco Control, supra note 152.
160. Id.
161. Corporate Accountability International, supra note 155.
http://www.fctc.org/
Vision
and
Mission,
Tobacco
Control,
162. Alliance
for
index.php?item=aboutus&code=vm (stating that the mission of the FCTC is to "carry out
effectively the watchdog function for the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control") (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008).
163. NETWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY OF TOBACCO TRANSNATIONALS, HANDBOOK FOR FCTC
(2003),
http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/files/pdfs/Ratification
RATIFICATION
CAMPAIGNS

%20HandbookEnglish2005.pdf.
164. Id.
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NATT produces other publications that both describe the
historical and moral importance of the FCTC and emphasize the
human health norm the treaty embodies. NATT succinctly states the
FCTC's normative mission: "The FCTC, the first global public health
and corporate accountability treaty, will save millions of lives." 165 This
statement precedes the following narrative in the NATT Handbook:
The story of the FCTC inspires hope. The developing world, led by a block of all 46
African nations and supported by dozens of civil society organizations, united around
protecting the health of their people from the deadly expansion of Big Tobacco. Despite
staunch US opposition through the process and aggressive attempts by ... [corporate
giants] to derail the treaty, the FCTC will go a long way toward curbing the global
spread of tobacco addiction when implemented. 166

The simple statement of purpose and accompanying history of
the treaty engage norms of human health, social equality, and
corporate responsibility.
NATT also advertises and distributes statistics and warnings
on tobacco-related deaths in its publications and on its website. 16 7 For
example, it informs states that "half of children are exposed to tobacco
smoke at home," and "a cigarette is the only legally available
consumer product that kills through normal use. ' 168 These statistics
and warnings, coupled with graphic media, appeal to human health
and justice norms to make powerful normative arguments. By widely
disseminating these arguments, NATT increases its audience of
national and international actors.
IV. AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY

A. Shared Features of Successful Campaigns
The last Part introduced and described three ratification
campaigns. This Part analyzes those campaigns and identifies
particular features they have in common, analyzing these shared
features in light of the existing theories of state behavior described in
Part II. The successful ratification campaigns examined in Part III
share three features: (1) a close relationship with an 10, (2) clear
articulation of a normative argument, and (3) an emphasis on
information dissemination through local grassroots networks. These
features contain elements of rationalist, constructivist, and liberal
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 3.
An InternationalTreaty for Tobacco Control, supranote 152.
Id.
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theories, but importantly, no one theory adequately explains the
existence of every feature. Each common feature supports an aspect of
a different theory of state action, which suggests that a new
integrated theory of international law would better describe how and
why states ratify treaties.
1. 10 Partnership
Influential IOs supported each of the three ratification
campaigns discussed in this Note. The UN closely supported and
69
influenced the creation of the Rome Statute, the UN and ICRC1
supported the ICBL, and the WHO helped both in the creation and
widespread ratification of the FCTC. The link between 1Os and
successful campaigns supports a rationalist theory of state behavior
because rationalism predicts that states ratify treaties when the
treaties enhance cooperation between nations in ways that serve state
interests or link material benefits to ratification. Rationalists consider
1Os effective only to the extent that they serve the predetermined
interests of rational states. 170 Two unique characteristics of 1Os may
serve state interests. First, IOs can provide a concrete organizational
structure and an administrative apparatus for managing collective
activities. Second, 1Os can provide the authority to act with a degree
of autonomy in defined spheres. 71 Thus, IOs create a stable forum for
state cooperation, and states are more likely to ratify when an 10
supports a treaty.
International organizations also encourage ratification by
linking a treaty with material goals, such as economic aid.1 72 Although
the UN and WHO do not explicitly link treaty ratification to material
benefits, they have power to affect state livelihood through sanctions
as authoritative 1Os. Rationalist theory explains that 10 power to
facilitate cooperation on global issues and withhold material benefits
from states can encourage ratification.

169. The ICRC is considered sui generis, but for the purposes of this Note it serves the
function of an 10 because it is a widely respected international institution that facilitates state
cooperation.
170. Jos6 E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 324,

338 (2006) ("[R]ealists, who posit that IOs merely serve the predetermined interests of rational
states and are effective only to the extent that they serve these needs.").
171. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 5 (1998).
172. Sikkink, supra note 76.
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2. Clearly Stated Norms
Each ratification campaign framed its mission statement to
appeal to powerful normative values such as health and justice. The
CICC emphasized the need for international justice, the ICBL framed
its issue as a human health concern, and NATT classified the FCTC as
an essential public health treaty. In addition, all three campaigns
developed extensive publications, fact sheets, and other types of media
to persuade international and domestic actors with normative
arguments. Constructivism predicts that strategic use of information,
ideas, and stories will result in widespread ratification. By contrast,
rationalism and liberalism predict that normative messages are
unimportant and therefore unlikely to influence ratification. Thus, the
strong emphasis on normative arguments in these ratification
campaigns strongly supports a constructivist theory of state behavior.
3. Grassroots Information Dissemination
Each ratification campaign discussed above published
manuals and other documents targeting domestic organizations.
These campaigns made significant efforts to reach domestic grassroots
networks and arm them with lobbying strategies. For example, the
CICC developed papers specifically targeting political organizations
within certain countries. 173 Liberalism explains the success of this
strategy. It argues that domestic interests determine state behavior,
and therefore states ratify when domestic actors lobby for ratification.
Liberal theories explain, in part, why the ratification campaigns that
targeted domestic governments succeeded.
Constructivism
also explains rapid ratification when
campaigns are facilitated by grassroots dissemination of information.
Widespread information can "shame" a human rights violator in the
international arena and initiate ratification. 174 Shaming can challenge
a state to ratify to prove that it acts according to international norms.
For example, alerting a domestic government that its nation is a
chronic human rights violator has been an impetus for change. 175 On
October 2, 1968, the Mexican military fired machine guns into a
student demonstration in Tlateloco Plaza. The Mexican government
officially admitted forty-three deaths, but survivors confirmed that
300-500 were killed, 2,000 were wounded, and 1,500 were taken
173. Interview, supranote 111.
174. See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 52, at 34 (presenting a "spiral model" of human rights
change whereby governmental mobilization initiates rule-consistent behavior by the state).
175. Id.
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prisoner. The 1968 massacre did not inspire the same international
outrage as China's Tiananmen Square massacre, however, because
the Mexican government controlled information. 176 States can be
persuaded by international norms to behave a certain way.
Constructivism and liberalism together explain NGO networks'
importance in persuading domestic actors through story telling. NGO
networks, such as those created by ratification campaigns, are
essential for distributing and making normative arguments. Risse and
Sikkink argue that NGOs diffuse human rights norms because they
are able to tell stories. 177 For example, Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel
Uncle Tom's Cabin, which sold 300,000 U.S. copies in its first year,
fueled the United States' antislavery campaign.178 Using detailed case
studies documenting change in human rights in Latin American
countries, Jeffrey Huffines observes that the "role of the NGO
community has been essential in generating popular support for
human rights.., and in applying political pressure" to accomplish
ratification.1 79 Ratification campaigns are able to create political
pressure to ratify by making normative arguments to important
domestic actors.
B. The Importance of U.S. Support
The ratification rates of the treaties examined in this Note
reveal another interesting pattern of state behavior. U.S. support or
opposition to a treaty substantially affects the rate of ratification.
Although the United States did not ratify the Rome Statute, the
Ottawa Convention, or the FCTC, it has actively opposed only one of
the treaties discussed above: the Rome Statute.18 0 The United States
publicly embraced the Ottawa Convention's goals and was among the
first to sign the FCTC. By contrast, the Bush Administration
announced U.S. opposition to the ICC in 2002, and in that year the
ratification rate of the Rome Statute plummeted.1 8 1 Although
ratification necessarily decreases after most states have joined, only
the Ottawa Convention and the FCTC had already been ratified by

176. See KECK & SIKKINK, supranote 63, at vii-ix.
177. Id. at 5 (arguing that the "diffusion of international norms in the human rights area
crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and
transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public
opinion and Western governments").
178. KECK & SIKKINK, supranote 63, at 47.
179. Huffines, supra note 107, at 652.
180. News Release, supra note 120.
181. See Table 1, supra p. 17.
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half of UN member states when their ratification rates decreased. The
Rome Statute experienced a decline in ratification rate not explained
by a necessary decrease in number of states available to ratify.
Brigette Suhr of the CICC acknowledged the United States' powerful
influence in a recent interview. 8 2 She noted, "I have never been on a[n
advocacy] mission where someone doesn't ask me about what the U.S.
is doing... . What the U.S. thinks influences whether states want to
support or not support the ICC. ' 1 83 As rationalism predicts, therefore,
the actions of a world superpower affect the behavior of other nations.
Figure 1: RATIFICATION RATES
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C. Inadequacy of Individual Theories: Case Studies
Previous case studies documenting national ratification
debates support the conclusion that each theory explains only a part of
the ratification process. For instance, the United States still has not
ratified the Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR") although the Convention opened for signature and

182. Interview, supra note 111.
183. Id.
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adoption more than forty years ago. 184 The main reason for this delay
is that the U.S. government denies that an economic, social, or
cultural human right exists. 185 Put another way, between the United
States and the signatories of the treaty, there is a "lack of the
necessary community of values. '' 186 That the United States has
delayed ratification for the ICESCR because it disagrees with the
norms the treaty embodies suggests that a constructivist theory
accurately describes one aspect of the ratification decision. However,
liberalism also explains the delay. In addition to a lack of shared
values, the United States delayed ratification of the ICESCR because
1 87
a lack of national support slowed the political process.
In another case study, the United States ratified the Genocide
Convention thirty-seven years after the Convention opened for
signature.1 8 8 The main obstacle to ratification of the Genocide
Convention was that Congress did not prioritize ratification.1 89 Other
issues took precedence on the political agenda. A lack of U.S. "political
capital" impeded ratification of the Genocide Convention. 190 For both
the ICESCR and Genocide Convention, therefore, domestic actors did
not impart the treaties with enough momentum for ratification.
Britain's ratification of the Genocide Convention evinces the
ways in which rationalism, constructivism, and liberalism influence
the decision to ratify. Brian Simpson recently documented Great
Britain's ratification of the Convention and observed that, at its core,
the decision to ratify was a political one.1 91 Departments within the
British government held uncompromising positions and disagreed on
the domestic implications of the Convention and its function; 192 this
deadlock prevented the government from ratifying the treaty for over
two decades.1 93 According to Simpson, Britain ultimately yielded to

184. Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potentialfor United States Adoption
and Enforcement of The Convention Against Torture, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311 (1990).
185. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 367 (1990).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 373.
188. Nagan, supra note 184, at 311.
189. Id. at 337.
190. Id.
191. A. W. Brian Simpson, Britain and the Genocide Convention, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 5,
47 (stating that "[a] decision to accede or not accede was a political issue").
192. Id. at 64. One view held that the function of the Convention was symbolic, and the other
that it was practical. Id.
193. Id. at 6.
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foreign state pressure and ratified. 194 In a subsequent article, Jose
Alvarez considered how rationalists, liberals, and constructivists
would interpret Simpson's case study. 195 For rationalists, the delayed
ratification illustrates the fundamental irrelevance of norms in
influencing state behavior because states cannot be rushed to ratify a
treaty until it is in their material interest to do so. 196 For
constructivists, Simpson's work provides a rich account of the ways in
which persuasion and status-oriented concerns ultimately forced
ratification. 197 It was only when the international community exerted
its power to shame Britain that the state ratified. 98 For liberals,
however, the relations between the rival governmental offices reveal
the importance of domestic interest groups; 99 the ratification process
failed without the support of the domestic factions. Alvarez
highlighted an important theme in Simpson's case study: "the realworld practice of states is messy."20 0 Indeed, each of the theories of
international law explains the process of ratification in a useful way.
But examining ratification through the lenses of all three theories
20 1
together reveals a more complete picture of state behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note takes the initial step of analyzing ratification
campaigns and exploring the reasons for their success. It also
194. Id. at 11. ("No other State was so dismissive; as time passed it became increasingly
clear that the negative line adopted was becoming embarrassing, and could be viewed as showing
indifference to genocide.").
195. Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 962 (2004) ("Professor Brian
Simpson's work on the history and genesis of the European Convention of Human Rights, based
on exhaustive research of recently opened archives within Great Britain, serves as the basis for
this critique.").
196. Id. at 963 ("Realists like Professor John Mearsheimer would see.., a cautionary tale
that shows the fundamental irrelevance of human rights treaties.").
197. See id. at 964 ("Goodman and Jinks presumably would put Simpson's case study to
different use. They would focus, instead, on the status-oriented concerns that ultimately drove
the British to approve the Genocide Convention when it was first proposed in 1948 and,
ultimately, to ratify it many years later.").
198. Simpson, supra note 191, at 48.
199. See Alvarez, supra note 195, at 964 ('The saga of Britain and the Genocide Convention,
rife with interdepartmental turf battles, is rich in Weberian insights.").
200. Id. at 968 (stating that in the real world "too many factors and personalities come into
play").
201. COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE

ICC, ACCORDING TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGIONAL GROUPS (last updated July 17, 2007),
ICBL, States Parties,
http://www.iccnow.org/documentslRatificationsbyUNGroup-18JulyO7.pdf;
http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); World Health Organization,
Tobacco
Control,
Updated
status
of
the
WHO
Framework
Convention
on
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/countrylist/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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examines the common features of a group of treaties that quickly
entered into force with the support of an NGO campaign. These case
studies reveal deficiencies in the three generally accepted theories of
state behavior and support an integrated theory of international law.
Each existing theory of state behavior alone is inadequate to explain
what makes a ratification campaign successful, suggesting that an
integrated theory of international law best explains a state's decision
to ratify.
A. Limitations
This Note focuses on NGO-driven treaty ratification campaigns
and the ways in which theories of state behavior explain their success,
but it does not address all of the factors that may influence
ratification-elements like the substantive content of a treaty, its
relative legal strength, or the current political regime in the ratifying
country. For example, a "no reservations clause" allows little room for
states to manipulate treaty terms in their favor and may slow
ratification. Further inquiries might explore which states are more
reluctant to ratify certain laws. One study has shown that the most
reluctant states may be those who are most likely to change their
behavior to comply with a treaty. 20 2 Therefore, commitment to a treaty
depends in part upon the decision to comply with its terms. 20 3 Thus,
legal enforcement and "collateral consequences" of treaty ratification
influence whether ratification occurs. 20 4 Where legal enforcement of a
treaty is weak, states may be more likely to commit to a treaty. 20 5 In
sum, commitment and compliance are interwoven: states commit
based on their incentives to comply. 20 6 The effect of treaty enforcement
on a state's decision to ratify is a valuable inquiry. However, this Note
is limited to examining the commonalities of successful ratification
campaigns.

202. Hathaway, supra note 16, at 494.
203. Id. at 473.
204. Id. at 492. "Legal enforcement is determined by the terms of the treaty and the
enforcement of those terms as specific obligations ... . Collateral consequences arise from the
anticipated reactions of individuals, states, and organizations to the state's decision to commit to
the treaty and then to abide or not by its terms." Id.
205. Id. at 519.
206. Id. at 535 ("Commitment and compliance are interwoven: States commit based on their
incentives to comply, and states comply based on their incentives to commit.").
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B. Implicationsfor InternationalLaw Theory
This Note finds that certain features of treaty ratification
campaigns determine their success in achieving broad ratification.
While international law scholars present three general theories of
state behavior, they have not tested these theories against the
dynamics of ratification campaigns, nor has any legal study analyzed
treaty ratification campaigns to determine what makes them effective.
This Note takes the first step in filling this gap in legal and
international relations scholarship.
By exposing the strengths and weaknesses of existing
international relations theories, a more complete understanding of
state behavior emerges within the context of treaty ratification. This
Note analyzes empirical information and explores the common
features of successful ratification campaigns. The treaty ratification
campaigns this Note examines share three features: the support by a
powerful 10, the development of normative arguments, and the
targeting of domestic actors. Testing these common features against
the three general theories of state behavior reveals that an integrated
theory best describes a state's decision to ratify. Rationalist,
constructivist, and liberal theories might explain widespread
ratification individually, but only when applied together can one fully
understand the success of these treaties. Thus, the ratification
patterns examined in this Note suggest that an integrated theory of
international law would better describe why states ratify.
Uta Oberddrster*
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